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Abstract
The evolution over the years of  the mandates and missions of  international organizations has 
reached an important milestone with the emergence and multiplication in the last decade of  
procedures and mechanisms having a direct impact on individuals and companies. This has 
gone together with the call for the creation of  international remedies with judicial features. 
International organizations, including the World Bank, have established sanctions mecha-
nisms in an effort to combat corruption and fraud. They are applicable to companies and indi-
viduals involved in activities with international financial institutions through procurement 
or consultancy activities. The World Bank experience offers an interesting example: the deci-
sion to sanction individuals and companies entailed the need to provide access to remedies to 
such non-state actors. External and internal pressures have pushed the institution into put-
ting in place very quickly a mechanism with judicial features. Due process requirements have 
had a substantial impact on the profile of  remedies available to non-state actors in this area.
1 The Context
The profile of  international organizations has significantly evolved in the last few 
decades. International organizations have been exposed to new demands, and in 
response they have developed innovative rules and mechanisms, which in turn have 
required specific policing measures. These functions include, inter alia, regulatory 
activities and the establishment of  compliance and sanctions procedures.
The ever-increasing scope of  activities of  international organizations has an impact 
on individuals and non-state actors as the activities of  international organizations 
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have an increasing influence on their daily lives. The rights of  individuals and other 
non-state actors can be affected when these activities attempt to regulate their behav-
iour and impose sanctions in the case of  misconduct. These increased regulations by 
international organizations have led to individuals and non-state actors challenging 
the decisions of  international organizations, as well as making requests for access to 
remedies because their interests and rights may well be affected. For example, in the 
context of  the United Nations, one of  the most central issues has been the imposi-
tion of  economic sanctions, pursuant in particular to resolution 1267 of  the Security 
Council1 and the request to ensure respect for the human rights of  the listed individu-
als. The progressive transition from a traditional system of  sanctions directed at states 
to the rise of  so-called ‘smart sanctions’, and the ensuing individualization of  the UN 
sanction process, necessitates the establishment of  mechanisms that permit individu-
als to defend their rights. In 2009, this necessity led the UN to, inter alia, establish an 
office for an Ombudsperson, who is in charge of  dealing with de-listing requests.2
As another example, international financial organizations have established sanc-
tions systems for sanctioning companies and individuals that have been found to have 
engaged in fraud and corruption in activities financed by those organizations. The sanc-
tions imposed by the World Bank on individuals and firms engaging fraud and corruption 
have given rise to issues that are similar in many aspects to those emanating from the UN 
context. In both situations there is a sanctioning institution of  an international organiza-
tion on the one hand, and individuals or firms targeted by sanctions on the other hand. 
The establishment of  mechanisms allowing the sanctioned non-state actors to defend 
themselves counterweights the taking of  decisions that negatively affect the latter.
The situation faced by these international organizations can be compared with a certain 
image of  justice as incarnated by Lady Justice holding a sword in her right hand and the 
scales in her left hand. Concomitant with the ability to sanction must be a thorough pro-
cess of  balancing all aspects of  a case, which ensures that in the end each party receives 
a fair and just outcome. Access to remedies is an integral part of  this weighing process.
Access to remedies is a global public good. The concept of  global public goods 
includes not only goods in a traditional sense, but also concepts like peace, legal pro-
tection, as well as human rights.3 Everyone is entitled to have access to remedies. 
Remedies are not exclusive, in the sense that they should apply equally to anyone in a 
similar situation.
The provision of  remedies by international organizations has received little attention 
in international law circles. However, they do deserve attention. Understood in a broad 
manner, remedies are ‘the means of  enforcing rights and redressing wrongs’.4 They are 
1 See the resolution at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/300/44/PDF/N9930044.
pdf?OpenElement (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
2 SC Res. 1904, 17 Dec. 2009. See Boisson de Chazournes and Kuijper, ‘Mr Kadi and Mrs Prost: Is the UN 
Ombudsperson Going to Find Herself  Between a Rock and a Hard Place?’, in E. Rieter and H. de Waele 
(eds), Evolving Principles of  International Law – Studies in Honour of  Karel C. Wellens (2011), at 71–90.
3 See, e.g., E. Andersen and B. Lindsnaes (eds), Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods and Human Rights 
(2007).
4 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edn, 1999), at 1296.
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part of  the broader concept of  access to justice5 that can be defined as ‘the individual’s 
right to obtain the protection of  the law and the availability of  legal remedies before a 
court or other equivalent mechanism of  judicial or quasi-judicial protection’.6 The con-
cept of  access to justice covers not only the right to seek a remedy before a court of  law 
or a tribunal but also includes those ‘remedies offered by competent public authorities, 
which are not courts of  law but can nevertheless perform a dispute settlement function’.7
Within international organizations, access to remedies can take various forms. The 
mechanisms established are diverse in their nature and their characteristics. There has 
been a blossoming of  independent review and compliance mechanisms. The World 
Bank Inspection Panel procedure, for example, enables groups of  persons affected by 
a Bank-financed project to seise the Panel in order to request that the Organization 
assess, and even correct, its own behaviour in accordance with its own standards and 
procedures. The Panel decides on the complaint’s eligibility, as well as on the merit of  
asking the Board of  the World Bank for authorization to undertake an investigation 
of  a particular action of  the financial institution having regard to the application of  
its operational policies.8 In the event of  an investigation, the Bank may be prompted 
to implement an action plan in order to correct the situation giving rise to complaint.9
Other remedies involve internal oversight mechanisms for detecting and sanction-
ing staff  misbehaviour including in the area of  fraud and corruption, or for allowing 
access to information. As an example, the latest version of  the World Bank’s Policy on 
Access to Information10 of  1 July 2010 has significantly changed the institution’s atti-
tude to transparency in acknowledging that information in the possession of  the insti-
tution should be made accessible, albeit with some exceptions. In the context of  the 
application of  this policy, the Bank has created a new body, the Access to Information 
Committee (AI Committee).11 Its mandate is to advise the management on the appli-
cation of  the policy, to interpret the policy, and to participate in the management of  
the system. It also adjudicates on appeals relating to the policy. In addition, an inde-
pendent appeals board composed of  ‘three outside experts on access to information’ 
has been established.12 The Appeals Board has the authority to uphold or reverse the 
relevant decisions of  the AI Committee. Its decisions are final. The Committee and the 
Board are composed of  people external to the Bank.
5 In this vein see Effect of  Awards of  Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion of  13 July 1954, [1954] ICJ Rep 57.
6 Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of  Justice and International Investment Law’, 20 EJIL (2009) 729.
7 Francioni, ‘The Rights of  Access to Justice under Customary International Law’, in F. Francioni (ed.), 
Access to Justice as a Human Right, Collected Courses of  the Academy of  European Law (2007), at 4.
8 IBRD Res. No. 93-10, IDA Res. No. 93–6 of  22 Sept. 993, at paras 12 and 14 a.
9 See Boisson de Chazournes, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: About Public Participation and Dispute 
Settlement’, in T.  Treves et  al. (eds), Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies (2005), at 
187–203.
10 See /www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/06/03/0001127
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As another example, the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel examines 
complaints of  alleged human rights violations committed by or attributable to 
the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, but limits itself  to issuing 
recommendations.13
In the short time-span since the establishment of  these remedies, their profiles 
and structure have evolved, indicating a path towards due process, not to mention a 
preference for judicial procedure. This exemplifies the fact that due process require-
ments have played, and continue to play, an important role in the shaping and the 
evolution of  the structure and function of  remedies established by international 
organizations. Protection of  the rights of  non-state actors requires the setting up 
of  remedies with judicial features.14 Remedies are thus becoming more and more 
judicial in nature.
These developments are also linked to international organizations’ respect for the 
rule of  law. The understanding of  the rule of  law within international organizations 
cannot be limited to norms and principles. Respect for the rule of  law entails a sort of  
continuum. Rules, norms, and principles call for means to ensure that their ‘benefi-
ciaries’ are entitled to claim their respect and have access to means of  redress. These 
issues are enshrined in the broader question of  the scope of  law applicable to interna-
tional organizations. The work of  the ILC on the responsibility of  international organ-
izations has revealed the intensity of  the debate on this issue.15 The Kadi, Yusuf  and Al 
Barakaat case brought before the European judicial institutions has illustrated, in its 
various phases, the questions that can be posed with respect to decisions taken by the 
Security Council.16
The mechanism established by the World Bank to sanction individuals and firms 
committing fraud and corruption offers an interesting prism: together with the deci-
sion to sanction individuals and companies, it was felt necessary to provide access 
to remedies to them. In this context, it is interesting to note that the World Bank has 
in a short time frame put in place a mechanism with judicial features (section 2). 
13 See Klein, ‘Le panel consultatif  des droits de l’homme (Human Rights Advisory Panel) de la MINUK: 
une étape dans le processus de responsabilisation des Nations Unies?’, in M. Kohen, R. Kolb, and D.L. 
Tehindrazanarivelo, Perspectives of  International Law in the 21st Century/Perspectives du droit international 
au 21ème siècle – Liber Amicorum Professor Christian Dominicé in honour of  his 80th birthday (2012), at 225.
14 The establishment of  administrative tribunals by international organizations is also a consequence of  
this need to provide access to remedies. These tribunals, such as the UN’s Dispute Tribunals or the World 
Bank Administrative Tribunal, can be seen as a counterpart to the immunity enjoyed by international 
organizations. Given the impossibility for private parties, including staff  members, to bring disputes 
before domestic courts, the need was felt to provide them with alternative access to remedies. This need 
is increasingly considered as a result of  human rights obligations involving access to justice. See, e.g., 
Reinisch, ‘The Immunity of  International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of  their Administrative 
Tribunals’, 7 Chinese J Int’l L (2008) 285.
15 See the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  International Organizations at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft articles/9_11_2011.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
16 Case T–315/01, Kadi v. Council & Commission [2005] ECR II–3649; Case T–306/01, Yusuf  & Al Barakaat 
International Found. v. Council & Commission [2005] ECR II–3533; Joined Cases C–402/05 P & 415/05 P, 
Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of  the European Union [2008] ECR I–6351; Case T–85/09, Kadi v. Commission 
[2011] 1 CMLR 24.
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A number of  factors and events have led the Bank in this direction, in particular the 
fact that due process requirements have a substantial impact on the profile of  rem-
edies available to non-state actors (section 3).
2 The World Bank’s Sanctions Process: The Establishment 
of  a Hybrid Procedure with Judicial Features
International organizations, including the World Bank, have established sanctions 
mechanisms in an effort to combat corruption and fraud. These mechanisms are 
applicable to companies and individuals involved in activities with the World Bank 
through procurement or consultancy activities. The World Bank realized that there 
was a necessity to fight corruption so as to protect its funds. To this end, it established 
a sanctions mechanism on an ex nihilo basis.
A Overview
1. The Action of  the World Bank Against Fraud and Corruption
For many years, corruption was perceived as a political problem not related to issues 
of  economic development. One of  the arguments for international economic organ-
izations’ reluctance to act stemmed from unwillingness to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of  their members.17 However, the link between the problems of  corruption, 
governance, and development gradually gained prominence through the 1990s.18 
In 1996, the President of  the Bank at the time, James Wolfensohn, in an attempt to 
stigmatize corruption, used the metaphor that corruption was like a cancer on devel-
opment because it reduced the effectiveness of  development assistance.19 Corruption 
gained pre-eminence on the Bank’s agenda. Corruption was perceived as a ‘cost’,20 
reducing growth and development through the diminution of  investments made at 
the domestic and international levels.
It became clear that the fight against corruption was not in opposition to the com-
mitment of  non-interference in the political affairs of  members.21 Furthermore, 
17 Referring, e.g., to Art. IV(10) of  the IBRD Articles of  Agreement: ‘the Bank and its officers shall not inter-
fere in the political affairs of  any members; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of  the member or members concerned’.
18 See Shihata, ‘Corruption – A  General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of  the World Bank’, 15 
Dickinson J Int’l L (1997) 451.
19 Wolfensohn, ‘People and Development’, in J.D. Wolfensohn and A.  Kircher, Voice for the World’s Poor: 
Selected Speeches and Writings of  World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, 1995–2005 (2005), at 50. 
The need to eliminate corruption was stressed already in his very first speech as President of  the Bank, in 
1995: see Wolfensohn, ‘New Directions and New Partnerships – Address to the Board of  Governors’, 10 
Oct. 1995, available at: http://goo.gl/J7iaO.
20 Bhargava, ‘Curing the Cancer of  Corruption’, in V. Bhargava (ed.), Global Issues for Global Citizens: An 
Introduction to Key Development Challenges (2006), at 5.
21 I. Shihata, The World Bank Legal Papers (2000), at 219–244. The points developed in this book were made 
earlier in the legal opinion by I. Shihata entitled Prohibition of  Political Activities in the Bank’s Work of  July 
1995.
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under its Articles of  Agreement, the Bank has a ‘fiduciary responsibility’ to its 
shareholders. Accordingly, it must ‘make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds 
of  any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due 
attention to considerations of  economy and efficiency and without regard to politi-
cal or other non-economic influences or considerations’.22 When the Bank decided 
to tackle the problem of  fraud and corruption, it referred to this provision as pro-
viding the legal basis for the fight against fraud and corruption.23 The institution 
started by conducting research on the causes and economic consequences of  this 
phenomenon, as well as offering assistance to authorities wishing to take action 
against it.
The Bank published a number of  reports dealing with corruption, which had a 
significant political impact.24 The instruments and legal means to tackle corrup-
tion were then identified. The anti-corruption strategy adopted by the Board of  
Directors in September 1997 identifies four components to the action of  the Bank 
in this area: assisting states that ask for help in curbing corruption, incorporating 
its concern for corruption directly into its country analysis and lending decisions, 
contributing to the international effort against corruption, and, finally, preventing 
fraud and corruption in the projects and programmes it finances.25 A normative 
strategy and procedures were then developed, demonstrating the clear intention 
of  the Bank to exclude companies which engage in corruption or other sanction-
able practices.26
The need to develop an effective mechanism for sanctioning companies and indi-
viduals found to have engaged in fraud or corruption was acted upon by the Bank 
through the establishment of  a sanctions system.
2. From the Need to Tackle Fraud and Corruption to the Ex Nihilo Establishment of  a 
Sanctions Mechanism
The action of  the World Bank in fighting fraud and corruption initially consisted 
of  defining those practices that might be sanctioned in the Procurement Guidelines 
and also in the Consultant Guidelines. Over time, the scope of  the Bank’s activity 
in this context has expanded through a constant reform effort on its part. In 1999, 
22 IBRD Articles of  Agreement, Art. III(5)(b)), available at: http://tinyurl.com/64h2pkh (last visited 1 Aug. 
2012).
23 Chanda, “The Effectiveness of  the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal and Structural 
Obstacles and Uncertainties’, 32 Denver J Int’l L & Policy (2003–2004) 349.
24 See The World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of  the World Bank’, Sept. 1997, 
available at: www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 
2012).
25 The World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997’, June 
2000, available at: www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/helpingcountries.pdf  (last visited 1 
Aug. 2012).
26 Williams, ‘The Debarment of  Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts’, 36 Public 
Contract LJ (2007) 280.
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corruption27 and fraud28 were the only practices that it sanctioned. However, in 2004, 
the Bank added coercion29 and collusion,30 and, in 2006, the Bank added obstructive 
practices.31
The next step taken by the Bank was the adoption of  procedures to sanction the 
condemned practices. It was framed as a technique of  exclusion, or debarment, that 
can be defined as ‘an administrative remedy utilized to disqualify contractors from 
obtaining public contracts or acquiring extensions to existing contracts for alleged 
breaches of  law or ethics’.32
The objective was at any time to exclude a company or individual, temporarily or 
permanently, from any Bank-financed contract and the possibility of  being selected 
as a subcontractor, consultant, supplier, or service provider to a company that might 
be awarded finance by the Bank.33 The institution may impose the following types 
of  sanctions: a public letter of  reprimand, debarment, conditional non-debarment, 
debarment with conditional release, and/or restitution.
Established in 1998, the Sanctions Process progressively evolved through four 
rounds of  reforms successively conducted in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2009–2010. 
Each round brought with it amendments and additions to the procedure.
As a first step, in 1998 a mechanism for investigating fraud and corruption activi-
ties was established. It was overseen by the Internal Auditing Department. It was 
respons ible for gathering evidence and then transferring that evidence to a newly 
27 ‘“[C]orrupt practice” means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of  any 
thing of  value to influence the action of  a public official in the procurement process or in contract 
execution’: Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Jan. 1999, at para. 1.15 and 
Guidelines: Selection and Employment of  Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, Jan. 1999, at para. 1.25. 
See all documents at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,
contentMDK:20060840~pagePK:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html (last visited 1 
Aug. 2012).
28 Defined as ‘a misrepresentation or omission of  facts in order to influence a procurement process or the 
execution of  a contract’: ibid.
29 “‘[C]oercive practice” means harming or threatening to harm, directly or indirectly, persons, or their 
property to influence their participation in a procurement process, or affect the execution of  a con-
tract’: Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, May 2004, at para. 1.14 and Guidelines: 
Selection and Employment of  Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, May 2004, at para. 1.22.
30 ‘[A] scheme or arrangement between two or more bidders, with or without the knowledge of  the 
Borrower, designed to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels’: ibid.
31 ‘(i) [D]eliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of  evidence material to the investigation or 
making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into allega-
tions of  a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive, or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing, or intimidat-
ing any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of  matters relevant to the investigation or from 
pursuing the investigation, or (ii) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of  the Bank’s inspection 
and audit rights’: Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Oct. 2006, at para. 1.14 and 
Guidelines: Selection and Employment of  Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, Oct. 2006, at para. 1.22.
32 Schooner, ‘The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Exclusion and Debarment’, 5 Public Procurement L Rev 
(2004) 212–213, cited by Williams, supra note 26, at 284.
33 Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Jan. 2011, at para. 1.16 (d).
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created body – the Sanctions Committee.34 The Bank reformed the investigation pro-
cedure in the early 2000s and investigations now fall under the responsibility of  the 
Integrity Vice Presidency (INT).
The sanctions procedures evolved in 2004. A two-tiered structure was established. 
The first level consists of  the Evaluation and Suspension Officer, and the second level 
of  a Sanctions Board. This structure is still the current one.
It works as follows. Investigations are conducted by INT through witness inter-
views, gathering documents, site visits, exercising audit rights, etc. The investigations 
cover only the activities of  companies and individuals. Once the evidence is collected, 
INT refers the case to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer by drafting a Statement 
of  Accusations and Evidence. The Evaluation and Suspension Officer must then decide 
whether the evidence collected is sufficient to conclude that a sanctionable practice 
has been committed. If  this is the case, the Evaluation and Suspension Officer shall 
notify the company or the individuals concerned via a Notice of  Sanction Proceedings. 
The Evaluation and Suspension Officer also determines whether a suspension shall 
become effective on a temporary basis pending the outcome of  the procedure. If  the 
company or individual concerned does not contest the allegations of  fraud or cor-
ruption, the sanction recommended by the Evaluation and Suspension Officer will be 
applied as a final decision.35
The case is otherwise referred to the Sanctions Board through an appeals proce-
dure. The Board conducts a de novo review of  the case before making a final decision. 
As part of  its deliberations, the Sanctions Board may hold a hearing if  requested to do 
so by INT or a respondent. The Sanctions Board may also sanction affiliates.
As regards the duration of  the exclusion, there has been a notable relaxation on the 
part of  the Bank. Indeed, while almost all sanctions adopted between March 1999 – the 
date of  the first debarment order – and April 2001 were made for an indefinite period, 
the majority of  the sanctions since then have been for an average period of  three years.36 
This might be seen as a follow-up of  recommendations made by an external panel, 
which issued a report known as the Thornburgh Report, which called for a sanction pro-
cess that ‘could impose severe sanctions when warranted, and yet, when not warranted 
under all the circumstances, retain sufficient flexibility to avoid permanent preclusion 
of  an otherwise capable company that possesses a capacity or expertise that few other 
firms do, and whose services may not be able to be supplied equally well by others’.37
34 See web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:50002288~
pagePK:84271~piPK:84287~theSitePK:84266,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012). It should, however, 
be noted that there were at least 3 cases in which companies were sanctioned for fraudulent behaviour 
before the first Sanctions Committee was established. The matter was handled discreetly and the com-
panies concerned were heard before being sanctioned. They agreed for a period of  time to refrain from 
bidding for Bank-financed contracts.
35 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010.pdf?r
esourceurlname=OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
36 Williams, supra note 26, at 298.
37 D. Thornburgh, R.L. Gainer, and C.H. Walker, Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of  the World Bank, 
14 Aug. 2002, at 64, cited by Williams, supra note 26, at 298.
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Once the sanction is pronounced, the names of  the companies and individuals sub-
ject to the debarment and the details of  the period of  exclusion are published on the 
Bank’s website.38 In 2010, it was decided that the determinations of  the Evaluation 
and Suspension Officer if  not contested, as well as those of  the Board, would be made 
public as of 2011.
A Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP) was also established in 2006.39 According 
to this procedure, firms not being investigated by INT may report to the Bank past 
behaviour that may be sanctioned. If  a firm is eligible for this programme, the Bank 
agrees not to sanction the firm and to keep its identity confidential. Consequently, the 
firm will have to implement a compliance plan to prevent future misconduct and run an 
internal investigation. In the case of  the emergence of  new practices, the firm would be 
debarred for a statutory period of  10 years. Initially motivated by the necessity for the 
Bank to acquire information on the functioning of  corruption and also to offer poten-
tial informants the incentive of  a reasonably predictable outcome for their cooperation, 
VDP may have undesirable consequences. More precisely, as the existence of  VDP is 
characterized by its ‘non-transparency’, it could mean that the Bank keeps wrongdoing 
activities secret from other Bank staff, other MDBs, and from citizens of  the host state.40
The efficacy and efficiency of  the sanctions procedures has been tested in practice. 
Since 2001, 529 companies and individuals have been excluded from being awarded 
contracts or loan agreements funded by the World Bank.41 These actions have been 
qualified as ‘performative’.42 It would be interesting to test their collateral effect on 
other proceedings, notably judicial proceedings. As a matter of  fact, they might be 
used as elements of  evidence in other dispute settlement fora.
In 2010, another development began to take shape with the publication by INT, the 
investigative branch of  the World Bank, of  the list of  referral reports sent to member 
states where the evidence indicated that the laws of  a Bank Group member country 
have been violated. The practice43 is to inform the member states of  the alleged prac-
tices as well as to induce them to pursue civil, criminal, or administrative cases against 
an individual or a company so as to determine whether any laws have been violated, 
and to take appropriate action under their own sovereign laws.44 Ideally, national 
38 The list is available at: http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=2242339&pagePK=
64148989&piPK=51391665&theSitePK=2242290 (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
39 The Executive Directors of  the Bank adopted the programmatic elements of  this Programme on 11 Aug. 
2006: see World Bank Press Release n°2007/35/INT of  1 Aug. 2006.
40 Kingsbury, ‘Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of  Global Regulatory Governance’, 
in H.  Cissé, D.D. Bradlow, and B.  Kingsbury (eds), International Financial Institutions and Global Legal 
Governance, The World Bank Legal Review, iii (2012), at 24.
41 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ACCUEILEXTN/NEWSFRENCH/0,,contentMDK:2
1935365~menuPK:1082583~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:1074931,00.html (last 
visited 1 Aug. 2012).
42 Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 24.
43 This practice was put in place even before the existence of  INT but remained hidden from the public until 
2010.
44 INT Annual Report 2010, p. iv, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ 
588889-1286308793420/INT_AR_2010_FINAL_DESIGN.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
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authorities will use this information to ‘undertake investigations, prosecutions, and 
adjudications’ within their countries, but ‘often [they] have not’.45
In 2011, INT issued 52 referral reports to member states and donor agencies.46 In 
a recent case, for example, INT uncovered evidence of  fraud under a 1.4 million US 
Dollar contract in a health project in Argentina for the supply of  refrigerators for vac-
cine storage. According to this evidence, a fraud was perpetrated by the winning bid-
der, a company, by swapping a qualified manufacturer of  refrigerators named in its 
bid for an unqualified one after winning the contract. The company was sanctioned 
with a three-year debarment47 and INT referred its findings to the relevant national 
authorities to conduct their own investigation.48 This development brings a political 
perspective to the procedure by involving the state that allegedly has jurisdiction over 
the private sector actor concerned. The private company may then be sanctioned both 
by an international organization and by the competent state authorities. The sanc-
tion, however, may differ in the two cases.
B A Hybrid Procedure: the Interaction of  Different Legal Traditions 
and Different Legal Orders
Established in a context with no similar precedent, the World Bank sanctions system 
is the result of  the progressive integration of  principles rooted in different legal tradi-
tions and legal fields. It was created by borrowing structures and principles from differ-
ent legal systems and has been described as representing a ‘synthesis of  elements from 
four different legal disciplines that have been imported, adjusted, and combined from 
national systems: contract law, tort law, and adjudicative procedures similar to those 
in the administrative agencies of  many countries’.49
National law plays quite an important role, as do general principles of  law. Indeed, 
national law has provided and can provide a useful point of  reference for the World 
Bank. It serves, for example, as a possible approach to a difficult legal issue for which 
the Bank’s framework provides no clear answer. It can also serve as a source for inno-
vative tools in the context of  amendments of  the Bank’s legal framework.
One of  the dominant characteristics of  the procedure, stressed by the World Bank50 
is its administrative nature. The question then arises as to the reasons for this qual-
ification. One answer would be that the mechanism is not intended to punish or 
impose responsibility in a criminal sense in respect of  those companies or individuals 
45 INT Annual Report 2011, p. iii, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ 
588889-1316720250792/INT_AR_FY11_web.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
46 Ibid., at 44–47.
47 See the determination of  the EO, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/
Resources/Notice_of_Uncontested_Proceedings_Case_144.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
48 INT Annual Report 2011, supra note 45, at 26.
49 Dubois and Nowlan, ‘Global Administrative Law and the Legitimacy of  Sanctions Regimes in International 
Law’, 36 Yale J Int’l L Online (2010) 16.
50 See, e.g., http://web.worldbank.org/WBSI.TE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21922722~menuPK
:34480~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
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concerned.51 The sanctions imposed, though serious, are not comparable to the crim-
inal penalties of  imprisonment. They are in fact closer in nature to a sanctions regime 
under national administrative law or under EU law.52 Admittedly, one of  the conse-
quences of  such a qualification would be that this mechanism does not adhere to the 
same level of  due process standards that may be seen in national criminal courts.
The administrative nature of  the proceedings is reflected in the permissive 
approach to evidentiary issues adopted by the World Bank. According to the sanc-
tion procedures, ‘any kind of  evidence may form the basis of  arguments presented 
in a sanctions proceeding and conclusions reached by the Evaluation Officer or the 
Sanctions Board. The Evaluation Officer and the Sanctions Board shall have discre-
tion to determine the relevance, materiality, weight and sufficiency of  all evidence 
offered. Hearsay evidence or documentary evidence shall be given the weight deemed 
appropriate by the Evaluation Officer or the Sanctions Board. Without limiting the 
generality of  the foregoing, the Evaluation Officer and the Sanctions Board shall 
have the discretion to infer purpose, intent and/or knowledge on the part of  the 
Respondent, or any other party, from circumstantial evidence. Formal rules of  evi-
dence shall not apply.’53
The common law ‘best evidence rule’ is clearly not a requirement.54 In other words, 
if  this rule applied to the World Bank sanctions procedures, secondary evidence, such 
as a copy of  a document, would not be admissible if  an original document existed 
but could not be submitted given that it had been destroyed or was unavailable for 
other reasons. INT can in fact present any evidence it can find to support an accusa-
tion or factual assertion. The Evaluation and Suspension Officer and the Sanctions 
Board have discretion to evaluate and weigh this evidence. They may freely decide 
that circumstantial evidence proffered by INT is sufficient or insufficient to support 
the relevant allegation.
With respect to the standard of  proof, INT must prove that it is ‘more likely than 
not’ that a respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice. This standard is clearly not 
equivalent to ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ which prevails in criminal law. According 
to INT’s view, this standard of  proof  is to be interpreted as requiring ‘more than 50 
percent of  the corpus of  evidence’. The choice of  such standard of  proof  by the World 
Bank stems from the same considerations that underlie the omission of  an explicit 
mens rea requirement from most of  the definitions of  sanctionable practices, namely 
the administrative nature of  the proceedings and INT’s lack of  investigative tools.55 
51 Leroy and Fariello, ‘The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms’ (2011), at 22, 
available at: http://works.bepress.com/frank_fariello/1 (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
52 Dubois and Nowlan, supra note 49, at 23.
53 Art. VII, Sect. 7.01 of  the World Bank Sanction Procedures, available at: http://sitesources.worldbank.org/
EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WBGSanctionsProceduresJan2011.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
54 For more information on the evidentiary flexibility see Leroy and Fariello, supra note 51, at 4–8.
55 A mens rea requirement can be found, however, in the definitions of  fraud and coercive practices made in 
2006: see IBRD Loans and IDA Credits Guidelines, Oct. 2006, supra note 31, at para. 1.14 and Selection and 
Employment of  Consultants Guidelines, Oct. 2006, supra note 31, at para. 1.22. See also Leroy and Fariello, 
supra note 51, at n. 41.
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Facing pressure during the 2006 round of  reforms to include an intent requirement, 
the World Bank argued that sanctions proceedings are not criminal in nature, and 
that such an intent requirement, commonplace in criminal law, has no place in this 
administrative law procedure. Furthermore, it argued that INT does not have a police 
force and, thus, should not be obligated to demonstrate intent, which can be difficult 
to prove in this context.
One can argue that the rules of  admissibility of  proof  adopted by the Bank, accord-
ing to which any kind of  evidence may form the basis of  arguments, are too permissive 
and might cause problems in the future. In fact, if  the World Bank decides to make a 
referral to a state for it to begin parallel proceedings, any evidence INT may trans-
fer may not be suitable, as most of  the states have adopted a more restrictive rule of  
admissibility of  evidence. Similar problems may arise due to the standard of  proof  
adopted by the World Bank. A given individual or firm sanctioned by the World Bank 
may not be similarly condemned at the domestic level in states where fraud and cor-
ruption are criminal offences requiring a higher standard of proof.
Leaving aside issues of  evidence, one may wonder what is the distinctive feature 
that allows us to describe the mechanism in question as ‘administrative in nature’. 
One may refer to French law for guidance. The difference between an administrative 
sanction and criminal punishment in that context is the nature of  the public author-
ity empowered to issue the sanction, which may be an administrative authority or a 
judge respectively.56 Applied in the context of  the World Bank, however, such a cri-
terion of  distinction does not answer the question adequately. We can nevertheless 
see, given the nature of  the sanctions system, elements of  a ‘quasi-judicial’ mecha-
nism. However, owing to the fact that it does not meet all of  the conditions of  being 
a ‘judicial’ entity – principally because it is not fully composed of  professional judges 
– it is more accurate to consider that the mechanism has more of  an ‘administrative 
nature’.57 It seems that a more decisive criterion is the nature of  the sanction itself. 
In other words, the World Bank sanctions process can be described as an administra-
tive mechanism as it imposes administrative sanctions. An administrative sanction 
in this context is principally defined by the overall goal of  the system and the partic-
ular purpose sought to be achieved by the imposition of  the sanction.58 In contrast 
to a criminal sanction, administrative sanctions such as those imposed by the World 
Bank do not seek to punish individuals. The goal is not to reduce the impact of  crime 
upon the citizenry to a degree that is socially tolerable.59 The goal is to protect the 
functioning of  an institution. The sanctions process aims to ‘leave a pool of  honest 
56 See www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/Guide_legistique_2/526.htm (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
57 A similar situation can be found in the case of  the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in the US when 
it authorizes debarment and suspension of  contractors convicted of, found civily liable for, or found by 
agency officials to have committed certain offences, or when other causes affect contractor responsibility. 
A Suspending and Debarring Official (SDO), who is not a professional judge, decides this administrative 
sanction. For more information see www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart 9_4.html (last vis-
ited 1 Aug. 2012).
58 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 60.
59 Ibid.
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and capable firms to undertake projects that the Bank finds useful for achieving the 
worldwide reduction of  poverty’.60 One can also argue that a secondary purpose 
is general deterrence, which effectively may reduce the impact of  such conduct on 
individuals.61
C A Process of  ‘Judicialization’
This being said, the sanctions procedure has progressively been judicialized. It has 
developed numerous features that result in its being increasingly conducted with the 
procedural intricacy and formality more akin to litigation in national and interna-
tional courts.62
1. The Procedure Before the Sanctioning Organs and the Respect of  Due Process
Due process covers all rights which must be guaranteed before courts of  justice, such 
as the provision of  adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard, as well as the abil-
ity to deliver a defence in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of  case.63 In the 
case of  a sanctions procedure established by an international organization, such as 
the World Bank sanctions procedure, it is noteworthy that international organizations 
chose to integrate, in their respective sanction processes, due process requirements 
similar to those imposed before courts and tribunals.
Due process requirements have been increasingly integrated into the functioning of  
the sanctions systems. These include the right to defence and the standard and burden 
of  proof  before these organs.
2. A Two-Tier Procedure
In line with the double degré de juridiction technique, a procedure for appealing the deci-
sions taken at a first stage is provided. Most of  the civil law countries have adopted a 
two-tier or three-tier jurisdiction model. It is undoubtedly one of  the main character-
istics of  a ‘judicial model’, such as it exists. If  the parties do not agree with the decision 
made by the court of  first instance, or first-tier tribunal, they can appeal the case to 
a higher court, or other appellate court, for final jurisdiction. The judgment made by 
the higher court will be final. In a nutshell, a two-tier structure consists of  the estab-
lishment of  two deciding organs, different from one another, and where one of  these 
organs, the first level or the second in the case of  an appeal, takes a final decision in 
the process.
These elements are present in the World Bank’s sanctions system. As mentioned 
above, the sanctions process is divided into two stages with two different deciding 
organs, the Evaluation and Suspension Officer and the Sanctions Board. In cases where 
60 Ibid.
61 Leroy and Fariello, supra note 51, at 6.
62 See R.B. Lillich and C.N. Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards ‘Judicialization’ 
and Uniformity (1994), at p. xi.
63 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, 1979), at 449.
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the party wishes to contest the Evaluation and Suspension Officer’s final determina-
tion, he or she may trigger a second tier review by filing a response with the Sanctions 
Board.64 This appeal mechanism is available within 90  days after receipt of  the 
Evaluation and Suspension Officer’s determination. If  uncontested during this time, 
the determination immediately enters into force.65 In a case where a party contests the 
determination, he or she must submit to the Sanctions Board a written response to the 
accusations or the recommended sanction of  the Evaluation and Suspension Officer, 
including written arguments and evidence. The Sanctions Board examines the case de 
novo and determines, based on the record, whether it is more likely than not that the 
respondent engaged in one or more sanctionable practices.
The determinations of  the Evaluation and Suspension Officer that have not been 
contested and the decisions of  the Sanctions Board are both binding and final.66 They 
take effect immediately, without prejudice to any action taken by any government 
under its applicable law.67 These features allow us to consider that decisions taken by 
these institutions can be assimilated to sanctions imposed by courts, especially as they 
are final and cannot be appealed.
The reasons that led to the establishment of  such a structure appear in the 
Thornburgh Report issued in 2002. In the previous structure adopted by the Bank, all 
cases of  debarment had been subject to the same process: a finding by the Sanctions 
Committee that a respondent engaged in fraud or corruption and a final decision by 
the President concurring with the Committee’s recommendation.68 There was no 
mechanism for disposing of  cases without a full hearing and no provision for tem-
porarily declaring a respondent ineligible during the period between the time that 
evidence was discovered and the time that the sanctioning process was completed.69 
From this situation a number of  challenges resulted for the Sanctions Committee: a 
continuous increase in the number of  cases, the increased complexity of  those cases, 
an increased length of  time between the referral of  a matter and the final disposal of  
that matter.70 The solution was to establish a new structure that allowed the Bank 
to dispose of  a significant proportion of  cases without the necessity of  a full hear-
ing before the Sanctions Committee and to permit the Bank temporarily to suspend 
a respondent from eligibility. According to the Thornburgh Report, the solution was 
to establish a first stage in the process composed of  a designated official of  the Bank: 
the ‘Reviewing Officer’.71 The expected outcome of  this proposed reform was a reduc-
tion in the number of  cases that go to the second tier, because ‘not all decisions of  
the Reviewing Officer would be appealed’.72 The World Bank would then be able to 
64 Art. IV, Sect. 4.04 of  the World Bank Sanction Procedures, supra note 53.
65 Ibid.,
66 Ibid., Art. VIII, Sect. 8.03 (a).
67 Ibid.
68 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 35.
69 Ibid.
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dispatch cases without going through the time and expense associated with a full 
review and hearing. The Bank followed this pragmatic approach to make the function-
ing of  the procedure more fluid. At the same time, it instituted an appeal procedure. 
Inadvertently or otherwise, the World Bank was in this way moving towards a proce-
dure that exhibited judicial features.
3. The Sanctions Board as an Independent and Impartial Organ
Independence is one of  the major characteristics of  a judicial body.73 It must be free 
from dependence, subjection, or control and especially from political entities.
Originally, when the sanctions procedure was first established,74 the President of  
the Bank had the choice between two different types of  composition for the Sanctions 
Committee that had been proposed.75 One would be to have the Committee fully com-
posed of  internal members of  the Bank (two Managing Directors, the General Counsel 
and two other senior staff).76 The other one was that three persons from outside the 
Bank would form the Committee.77 The President chose to appoint only internal mem-
bers from the World Bank. This choice was justified at the time by the fact that members 
of  the Bank were those who, on the basis of  their knowledge and experience, were able 
to assess whether it was in the interests of  the World Bank to continue to work with 
a company or individual about whom there existed concerns of  corruption or fraud.
The above-mentioned Thornburgh Report led to a change. According to the Report, 
‘in light of  the progressive solidification of  the Bank’s resolve to develop and demon-
strate procedures in all of  its operations that exemplify its commitment to fairness and 
due process and not simply good business practices ... and in light of  the experience of  
the Bank with the operations of  the Committee over the past few years, the composition 
of  the Committee now warrants reexamination’.78 The influence and importance of  the 
prin ciple of  due process is evident. Among the reasons for the change, there was a need 
to avoid any conflict of  interest that could result from the fact that the Committee also 
counts World Bank employees among its members.79 The Report recommended chang-
ing the composition by including external members on the Sanctions Board.80 Its com-
position would then be of  a mixed type with members both from the Bank and outside 
73 See, e.g., Federal Supreme Court of  Switzerland, Gundel v. FEI, 4P.217/1992 of  15 Mar. 1993, ATF 119 
II 271. See also Federal Supreme Court of  Switzerland, Lazutina v. CIO, FIS & TAS, ATF 129 III 425.
74 On the independence of  the Sanctions Committee see also Rigo Sureda, ‘Process Integrity and Institutional 
Independence in International Organizations: The Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Committee 
of  the World Bank’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes, C.R. Romano, and R. MacKenzie (eds), International 
Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: trends and Prospects (2002), at 187–191.
75 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 20.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., at 21.
79 Ibid., at 23.
80 The four external members are appointed by the Executive Directors of  the IBRD from a list of  candidates 
drawn up by the President of  the Bank after appropriate consultation. They must not have previously 
held or currently hold any appointment to the staff  of  the Bank, IFC, or MIGA and shall be familiar with 
procurement matters, law, dispute resolution mechanisms, or operations of  development institutions.
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it. Later, in 2007, another external panel issued the so-called Volcker Report that made 
a recommendation of  a similar nature. It highlighted the fact that the Chairman of  the 
Sanctions Board could also be a member of  the Bank and that this potentially posed a 
problem.81
Since 2004, the Sanctions Board has included four members from outside the Bank, 
with the other three members from inside the Bank. Since 2009, the Chair of  the 
Board has been one of  the external members.82
Independence and impartiality are two requirements contained in the code of  con-
duct for members of  the Sanctions Board.83 It is required that ‘each member of  the 
Sanctions Board shall consider each case fairly, impartially and with due diligence 
[and] shall act independently and shall not answer to or take instructions from Bank 
management, members of  the Board of  Executive Directors, member governments, 
Respondents or any other entity’.84 This highlights the need to have the organ com-
posed of  persons who should act like judges. In this regard, it is noteworthy that a 
majority of  the external members of  the current Sanctions Board are – or were – judges 
or arbitrators with international and domestic courts.85 This does not come from the 
Sanctions Board Statute, which requires the members only to be ‘familiar with pro-
curement matters, law, dispute resolution mechanisms, or operations of  development 
institutions’,86 but presumably from the willingness of  the Executive Directors and 
of  the President of  the Bank, the latter being the appointing authority for the mem-
bers of  the Board. This tendency is however recent. It was not the case indeed at the 
time of  the initial Sanctions Committee which was established in 1998. Moreover, the 
Tornburgh Report recommended that ‘circumspection should be employed in evaluat-
ing former judges and litigating attorneys – persons whose careers have been steeped 
in the mastery of  formal hearing procedures of  particular national jurisdictions and 
who are thus more likely than others (for example those whose primary experience 
has been with informal arbitration proceedings or administrative proceedings) to 
The three internal members of  the Sanctions Board are appointed by the President from among senior 
Bank staff  with knowledge of  Bank procurement and/or operational processes: Art. V, sects 2 and 4 of  the 
Sanctions Board Statute, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/
SanctionsBoardStatute_9_15_2010.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
81 Volcker, Gaviria, Githongo, Heineman Jr., Van Gerven, and Vereker, ‘Independent Panel Review of  the 
World Bank Group Department of  Institutional Integrity’, 13 Sept. 2007, at 26, available at: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Volcker_Report_Sept._12,_for_website_FINAL.pdf  (last 
visited 1 Aug. 2012).
82 Report of  the Working Group, ‘Implementing the Recommendations of  the Independent Panel Review 
of  the World Bank Group’s Department of  Institutional Integrity’, 23 Jan. 2008, available at: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/volcker_report_response.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
83 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/SanctionsBoardStatute_9_15_2010.




eSitePK:3601046,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
86 Art. V, sect. 2 of  the Sanctions Board Statute, supra note 80.
87 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 27.
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exhibit a penchant for procedural formality and rigidity’.87 This did not prevent the 
Bank from relying on the criteria of  judicial experience when appointing new mem-
bers. This underlies the vision it has of  the profile of  the organ, an organ which should 
decide on the basis of  law.
4. Publicity, Predictability, and Consistency
Publicity also contributes to the ‘judicialization’ of  the sanctions process. In January 
2011, a decision was taken by the World Bank to publish the full text of  the Evaluation 
Officer’s determinations in uncontested procedures as well as the decisions of  the 
Sanctions Board for Notices of  Sanction Proceedings issued after 1 January 2011.88 
Such an evolution will significantly impact on the sanctions process. As noted, ‘if  
the Sanctions Board makes a questionable decision, either because its reasoning or 
its assessment of  the evidence is flawed, that will be a matter of  public record and 
judged in the court of  public opinion’.89 The publication of  these decisions will con-
tribute to the ability of  external actors to assess the overall functioning of  the pro-
cedure. Discrepancies in the decisions will be scrutinized. In these circumstances, 
legal certainty and predictability in the sanctions process will become more promi-
nent.90 Noteworthy in this context is the fact that the new procedure specifies that ‘the 
Sanctions Board issue fully reasoned decisions, including both the basic facts of  the 
case as well as the legal reasoning underpinning their decision’.91
The Evaluation Officer’s determinations are also published, albeit in a different 
format.92 They include a brief  recital of  the case, including the accusations against 
the respondent, the fact that the Officer has found sufficient evidence to support the 
accusations, and that the respondent has not contested the case. They also set out 
the recommended (and now definitive) sanction to be imposed on the respondent and 
the aggravating and mitigating factors underlying the recommendation.
Additionally, in December 2011, the Sanctions Board started to publish a Law 
Digest.93 Updated on a periodic basis, this document describes ‘aspects of  [the 
Sanctions Board’s] decisions that it deems illustrative of  the legal principles it has 
applied in reaching its decisions’.94
The permanence of  the Sanctions Board is another factor which contributes to 
consistency and predictability. The Sanctions Board was created through an inter-
national act which defines the scope of  its functioning or, to quote the words of  the 
88 Art. X, Sect. 10.01 (b) of  the World Bank Sanction Procedures, supra note 53. 7 decisions of  the Sanction 
Boards have been available online since May 2012. See http://goo.gl/1bgSE (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
89 Leroy and Fariello, supra note 51, at 65.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., at 64.
92 Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/
EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:22911816~menuPK:7926949~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~
theSitePK:3601046,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
93 See the full text of  the Law Digest at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/
LawDigest2011WebVersion.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
94 Art. X, Sect. 10.01 (b) of  the World Bank Sanction Procedures, supra note 53.
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International Court of  Justice, through an ‘international instrument defining its juris-
diction and regulating its operation’.95 Consistency and predictability are favoured by 
such an approach. The decisions of  the Board benefit from the continuity of  its man-
date. The (re-)appointment of  its membership ‘in different phases’ contributes to this 
continuity.96
5. Problems Raised by the Exemption of  Public Officials
In assessing the judicial character of  the World Bank’s Sanctions Process, more prob-
lematic is the fact that the sanctioning organs have no competence to sanction member 
countries and government officials at any level or individuals working in state-owned 
enterprises. Although this exclusion is not explicitly stipulated in the Procurement 
and Consultant Guidelines, the practice of  the World Bank is a ‘long-standing policy 
not to sanction governments or government officials’.97 The World Bank invokes as 
justifications for this stance its cooperative structure and respect for the sovereignty 
of  its members. This exemption is furthermore justified by the Bank by the presence 
of  alternative means to address these cases, such as the obligation of  the borrower to 
take timely and appropriate action and the Bank’s ability to exercise contractual rem-
edies in the event that the borrower fails to do so.98
This position may potentially allow unpunished public officials to influence Bank-
financed projects and highlights a weakness of  the procedure, despite its increased 
judicialization. It is indeed going against the principal objective that led the Bank to 
establish such a sanctions system, which is to protect the funds entrusted to the World 
Bank. From a pragmatic point of  view, one can admit that it is difficult for the Bank 
to sanction public officials, as it would have neither the authority nor the capacity to 
handle such matters, especially when the state involved is one of  its members.
An alternative was suggested by the Thornburgh Report. It recommended ‘at a 
mini mum [to make] referrals to, cooperate with, and provide evidence to law enforce-
ment agencies and prosecutors in affected nations’.99 The purpose of  these measures 
would be to sanction the individual or firm through domestic authorities. Such mea-
sures offer better protection of  the Bank’s funds, but subject to a given state’s willing-
ness to act in the requisite way.
Another option would be to waive this exemption when a public official is engaged 
in fraud and corruption in his or her private capacity. Although the World Bank seems 
to agree on the principle,100 it is still unclear how it would define such private capacity. 
One way to define it would be, for example, to consider that the distinction operated 
 95 Nottebohm case (Preliminary Objection), Judgment of  18 Nov.1953, [1953] ICJ Rep 119.
 96 See Art. V, sect. 5 of  the Sanctions Board Statute, supra note 80.
 97 The World Bank Group’s Sanction regime: Information Note, at 19, available at: http://siteresources.world-
bank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/The_World_Bank_Group_Sanctions_Regime.pdf  (last visited 1 
Aug. 2012).
 98 Ibid.
 99 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 13.
100 The World Bank Group’s Sanction regime: Information Note, supra note 97, at 19–20.
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in the context of  state immunities between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. 
However, the adoption of  such a definition would probably lead to difficulties in terms 
of  proof. In such a process of  definition, the World Bank might find it useful to refer to 
the notion of  conflict of  interest. In most of  the cases of  corruption of  public officials, 
there is indeed a prior private interest that improperly influenced the behaviour of  
the public official. This is arguably the reason the UN Convention against Corruption 
identifies the prevention of  conflict of  interest as one way to prevent corruption.101
3 Between Self-Commitment and External Pressure: the 
Influence of  the External World
Several factors have led to the reform trend in favour of  the increased integration 
of  due process guarantees. Such an evolution is the result of  decisions taken by the 
World Bank. It acted this way in many respects due to pressures coming from outside 
the Bank.
A The Impact of  External Reviews on the Development of  the 
Procedure
On several occasions, the sanctions system of  the World Bank has been subjected to 
evaluations by external panels and audit reports. These evaluations have played an 
important role in shaping its structure and functioning. They have served the integra-
tion of  new ‘values’ into the mechanism. These panels have discussed the functioning 
of  the procedure and recommended possible ways to increase its legitimacy as well as 
its efficiency. Two panels had a very significant influence on the evolution of  the mech-
anism over time: Richard Thornburgh’s ‘Report Concerning the Debarment Process 
of  the World Bank’ (The Thornburgh Report)102 of  August 2002 and the Independent 
Panel Review of  the World Bank Department of  Institutional Integrity (The Volcker 
Report)103 of  September 2007.
The Thornburgh Report by former Under-Secretary General of  the UN and 
Attorney General of  the US, Richard Thornburgh, was ‘intended to provide an encap-
sulated view of  the experience – and the possible future course – of  the World Bank in 
101 Art. 12, sect.2 (e): ‘Measures to [prevent corruption involving the private sector] may include, inter alia: 
... Preventing conflicts of  interest by imposing restrictions, as appropriate and for a reasonable period 
of  time, on the professional activities of  former public officials or on the employment of  public officials 
by the private sector after their resignation or retirement, where such activities or employment relate 
directly to the functions held or supervised by those public officials during their tenure’. The text of  the 
Convention is available at: www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012). See also Trebilcock, ‘Implications of  the UN Convention against 
Corruption for International Organizations: Oversight, Due Process, and Immunities Issues’, [2009] Int’l 
Orgs L Rev 513.
102 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/thornburghreport.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 
2012).
103 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Volcker_Report_Sept._12,_for_website_FINAL.
pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
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attempting to identify and sanction, through the process of  debarment, organizations 
and individuals believed to have engaged in fraudulent or corrupt activities in relation 
to Bank-financed and Bank-executed projects’.104 Its report resulted in a major reform 
of  the sanctions system in 2004. As mentioned earlier, it led to the establishment of  
the two-tiered structure that continues to operate today.
The Independent Panel headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker 
was appointed by the World Bank in 2007 with the mission to review the work of  the 
Bank’s Department of  Institutional Integrity (INT). The Volcker Report has made 18 
recommendations, among them the need to increase the transparency of  INT’s inves-
tigatory policies, practices, and procedures and the externalization of  investigations 
on staff  misconduct not related to fraud and corruption. It also stressed the need to 
appoint as Chair of  the Sanctions Board a member of  the Board who would be exter-
nal to the Bank. Most of  these recommendations have already been implemented by 
the Bank or are in the course of  being implemented.105
The establishment of  an Independent Advisory Board, an outcome of  the Volcker 
Report, should also be seen as means of  exercising a sort of  ‘external pressure’ on the 
Bank. Established in September 2008, it is composed of  experts on governance issues 
and anti-corruption measures.106 It provides advice to the World Bank and plays a 
role as exercising pressure ‘from within’. As an example, the Independent Advisory 
Board had criticized the practice of  settlements as initiated by the investigative branch. 
Established in 2010, this procedure allows the negotiation of  the sanction between 
INT and the Respondent at any time during the formal procedure, but before the 
Sanctions Board has given its decision.107 This practice was perceived as a means used 
by the investigation branch to bypass the sanctions procedure, without abiding by the 
transparency and accountability requirements.
The various external reviews of  the sanctions process have had a great impact on 
its functioning. Procedural principles and techniques developed in other institutional 
contexts have also played a role in the shaping and strengthening of  the legitimacy of  
the procedure.
104 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXT 
DOII/0,,contentMDK:20646594~menuPK:588937~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSit
ePK:588921,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
105 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ACCUEILEXTN/NEWSFRENCH/0,,contentMDK:21
963028~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:1074931,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
106 As of  May 2012, the Board is composed of  Peter Costello (Australia’s Treasurer from 1996 to 2007), 
Chester Crocker (US Assistant Secretary of  State for African Affairs 1981–1989), Simeon Marcelo 
(Phillipines’ Ombudsman), and Mark Pieth (Professor at Basle University).
107 This procedure may lead to a suspension of  the proceedings for 60  days if  a joint request is made by 
INT and the respondent to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer. The agreement can take two different 
forms. In one procedure a Negotiated Resolution Agreement is signed. It ends or replaces the formal sanc-
tion by a penalty agreed between INT and the respondent. In the other procedure, a Deferral Agreement 
is signed, freezing the current procedure for a given period during which the respondent must comply 
with a number of  conditions. See The World Bank Group’s Sanction Regime: Information Note, supra note 97, 
at 8. For a recent example see the Negotiated Resolution Agreement between Oxford University Press and 
the World Bank Group at http://goo.gl/Le5SO.
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B Due Process, Transparency, and Accountability in the Shaping 
of  the World Bank Sanctions Process and the Strengthening of  its 
Legitimacy
Due process, transparency, and accountability have been progressively integrated into 
the World Bank’s Sanctions Procedure and their influence is indeed noteworthy. These 
principles have contributed to the development of  the sanctions system and provide a 
basis for its legitimacy. The World Bank has indeed attempted to legitimize the sanc-
tions system by integrating elements of  procedural fairness, as well as institutional 
safeguards, such as the autonomy between the organs of  investigation and sanction.
1. Investigation and the Demand for More Transparency and Due Process
The investigation procedure provided for in the Operational Memorandum of  1998 
included several steps. Where there existed serious suspicion of  a company an inves-
tigation would be launched. Two avenues were then possible. The investigation was 
assigned either to an investigative body outside the Bank or to the State authorities, 
which in a sense were victims of  the actions of  the company.108 In the second case, 
the investigation followed the relevant national procedures. In the first case, the 
Operational Memorandum of  1998 provided that the investigation conducted by an 
external body would be ‘conducted in a manner that fairly protects the privacy of  the 
accuser and the rights of  the accused firm; in particular, (a) the accused firm has the 
right to be assisted by legal counsel; (b) if  the accuser is willing to submit to cross-
examination, the Bank arranges for the accused firm to question the accuser in the 
presence of  Bank staff; and (c) the accuser may also be requested to answer under oath 
questions submitted by the accused’.109 It is evident here that the Bank sought to inte-
grate into the investigation process the principle of  due process and the right of reply.
From 2001, following significant developments regarding the investigative capacity 
of  the Bank, the tendency was to reduce the number of  investigations carried out by 
external organs and rather to rely on the staff  of  INT, the internal investigative depart-
ment of  the World Bank.
The Volcker Report of  2007, responsible for evaluating the functioning of  INT, 
highlighted that in the functioning of  an organ of  this kind there must be a balance 
between confidentiality on the one hand, and transparency on the other.110 On this 
question, the Report states that ‘there are important legitimate reasons for maintain-
ing confidentiality, some of  which relate to overall Bank disclosure policies. However, 
it is apparent to the Panel from its interviews of  Bank personnel that INT at times 
acts in excessive secrecy’.111 The Volcker Report continues, ‘INT’s policies, practices, 
and procedures should be transparent. To enhance INT’s relations with Operations 
108 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 14.
109 Ibid.
110 On these aspects see Fromageau, ‘Collaborating with the United Nations: Does Flexibility Imply 
Informality?’, 7 Int’l Orgs L Rev (2010) 439.
111 Volcker et al., supra note 81 at 20.
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staff  and to facilitate appropriate disclosures, INT in consultation with the Legal 
Department should re-evaluate some of  its practices that are taken under perceived 
concerns of  confidentiality’.112 This entailed that the World Bank’s investigative body 
had to integrate elements of  transparency into its functioning, even if  its investigative 
function per se implied a high level of  confidentiality.
Under the applicable policy, which entered into force in February 2011, INT is 
committed to promoting greater transparency in its functioning.113 The policy also 
identified four guiding principles on maximizing access to information, safeguarding 
the deliberative process and the integrity of  INT’s investigations, providing clear pro-
cedures for making information available, and recognizing a requester’s right to an 
appeals process.114
Hence substantive changes were made. INT has gradually incorporated the prin-
ciples of  transparency and due process in its working methods, and this trend is also 
evident at the level of  the sanctions organ.
2. The Sanctions Procedure and the Demand for More Transparency and Due Process
The presence of  procedural safeguards regarding the application of  sanctions was not 
really discernable in the Operational Memorandum of  1998. It rather emerged as a 
result of  a document published in August 2001 on the procedure of  the Sanctions 
Committee.115 This envisaged a notification procedure for sanctions. The notification 
contained the accusation, the sanction that may have been imposed, and the manner 
by which a respondent could contest the accusation.116 The company or individual 
had a period of  60 days in which to respond to the proposed notice of  sanction pro-
ceedings, after which INT had 20 days to submit a reply. At the end of  this exchange, 
a file was sent to the Sanctions Board members. During an ‘informal hearing’,117 the 
company and its legal counsel were presented with an opportunity to present evi-
dence, except for the calling of  witnesses.
These notification guarantees are also present in the current procedure, whether 
through the reference procedure of  allegations to companies or individuals (Notice 
of  Sanctions Proceedings118) or through the opportunity to respond in person to the 
Sanctions Board of  the World Bank. Similarly, an opportunity was given to respond in 
writing to the allegations made by the Evaluation and Suspension Officer. All of  these 
procedural safeguards strengthened the legitimacy of  the sanction proceedings, mak-
ing it ultimately more effective.
112 Ibid.
113 Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/
EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:20646594~menuPK:588937~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSit
ePK:588921,00.html (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
114 Ibid., at 2.
115 Thornburgh, Gainer, and Walker, supra note 37, at 15.
116 Ibid., at 17.
117 Ibid., at 18.
118 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010.pdf?r
esourceurlname=OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
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The process followed by the World Bank to strengthen the legitimacy of  the func-
tioning of  its sanctions process is one of  the examples of  the concerns of  international 
institutions in general to shore up their legitimacy and to enhance the effectiveness of  
their regulatory activities. One of  the means to this end is to apply procedural norms 
such as those developed by the Global Administrative Law project, that is to say trans-
parency, participation, reasoned decision-making, and legality, and by establishing 
mechanisms of  review and accountability.119 Over the years, the World Bank had used 
these principles, and continues to do so, in order to comply with its commitment to 
a fair and accountable sanctions process. Although great efforts had already been 
made, the current sanctions process as it stands today can still be improved from a pro-
cedural point of  view.120 Developments of  the sanctions process in the future are likely 
to be towards improved procedural protections modelled on the domestic structures. 
By this token, legitimacy and ultimately confidence in the adjudicatory process will 
be increased. This is fundamental for the World Bank as a condition for the collabora-
tion of  other multilateral institutions and member states in, for example, acquiring 
evidence to impose sanctions.
C Challenging the Decisions of  the World Bank? The Lifting of  the 
Immunities of  the World Bank for Due Process Reasons
The immunities of  the World Bank and its staff  have several consequences with respect 
to the sanctions process. They can be perceived as obstacles to obtaining remedies at 
the domestic level. Given the fact that the World Bank enjoys privileges and immuni-
ties, there is theoretically no remedy against the Bank when it exercises its discretion-
ary powers in making decisions concerning actions against fraud and corruption.
This said, when it comes to the potential review of  an act of  an international orga-
nization, courts and tribunals might decide in certain circumstances not to resort to 
the ‘avoidance technique’,121 or in other words to recognize immunity. As an emerg-
ing practice indicates, regional and domestic courts have started to take into account 
the ‘human rights impact’ of  their immunity decisions.122 This constitutes an attempt 
to subject international organizations to the rule of  law by waiving their immuni-
ties. This can happen when courts consider that an organization has failed to provide 
adequate means for aggrieved individuals to protect their rights, as for example with 
respect to staff  employment cases.123
119 Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 9. See also Boisson de Chazournes, Casini, and Kingsbury (eds), ‘Symposium 
on Global Administrative Law in the Operations of  International Organizations’, 6 Int’l Orgs L Rev (2009) 
315.
120 Dubois and Nowlan, supra note 49, at 25.
121 A. Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts (2000), at 127.
122 Reinisch, ‘The Immunity of  International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of  their Administrative 
Tribunals’, [2008] Chinese J Int’l L 295.
123 Martha, ‘International Financial Institutions and Claims of  Private Parties: Immunity Obliges’, in Cissé, 
Bradlow, and Kingsbury (eds), supra note 40, at 118.
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In these cases, European and domestic courts have shown a willingness to exercise 
judicial review where acts of  international organizations directly conflict with human 
rights obligations. They are searching for ‘alternative remedies’, such as administra-
tive or arbitral tribunals, which may be available to the plaintiffs before immunity is 
extended to international organizations. In the absence of  such alternative remedies, 
they may deny immunity based on the fact that an opposite decision may breach 
claimants’ fundamental right of  access to court. In the Waite and Kennedy case, the 
European Court of  Human Rights held, for example, that ‘a material factor in deter-
mining whether granting ... immunity from ... jurisdiction is permissible is whether 
the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effect-
ively their rights under the Convention’.124
Some domestic courts have gone quite far in their assessment of  the features of  such 
reasonable alternative remedies. For example, the Belgian Cour de Cassation adjudged, 
with respect to the Appeals Commission of  the Western European Union, that if  ‘it had 
effectively been invested with a jurisdictional role and the competence to settle disputes’, 
its composition and the modes of  designation permitted doubt as to its independence.125 
According to the Belgian court, this mode of  designation and the short period of  time of  
the mandate ran the risk that the members of  the Appeals Board were too closely linked 
to the organization.126 During its investigations, the Belgian court also found that there 
were no provisions for the execution of  the judgments of  the Commission,127 no pub-
lic hearing, and that the publication of  decisions was not guaranteed.128 These doubts 
arose from the fact that members of  the Appeals Commission are designated for only a 
two-year mandate by an intergovernmental committee. Consequently, it found that the 
procedure did not offer the guarantees necessary to secure a fair trial. Granting immu-
nity would thus have been incompatible with Article 6(1) of  the European Convention 
of  Human Rights, as it would have restricted access to domestic courts.
Similarly, in 2005, the French Cour de Cassation waived the immunity of  the 
African Development Bank by declaring admissible a case concerning a dispute with 
one of  its employees.129 The Court justified its decision on the basis that, by not giving 
a party access to a court of  law that rendered binding decisions, a denial of  justice 
would ensue and as such this violated the international public order.130
124 App. No. 26083/94, Waite and Kennedy, 18 Feb. 1999, 13 ECHR at para. 68.
125 Belgian Court of  Cassation, Western European Union v. Siedler, judgment S.04.0129.F, 21 Dec. 2009, at 
21–22 (author’s translation).
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., at para. 59.
128 Ibid., at para. 60.
129 French Court of  Cassation, Banque Africaine de Developpement v. M.A. Degboe, judgment 04-41012, 25 
Jan. 2005.
130 According to the court, ‘Attendu que la Banque africaine de développement ne peut se prévaloir de 
l’immunité de juridiction dans le litige l’opposant au salarié qu’elle a licencié dès lors qu’à l’époque des 
faits elle n’avait pas institué en son sein un tribunal ayant compétence pour statuer sur des litiges de 
cette nature, l’impossibilité pour une partie d’accéder au juge chargé de se prononcer sur sa prétention et 
d’exercer un droit qui relève de l’ordre public international constituant un déni de justice’: ibid.
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This review test can be applied to the World Bank’s sanctions system as it deals with 
access to justice issues. As an example, a domestic court could question its qualifica-
tion as a ‘reasonable alternative remedy’. As it stands, four of  the seven members of  
the Sanctions Board are external members appointed from a list of  candidates drawn 
up by the President of  the Bank131 and three are chosen by the President of  the Bank 
from among senior Bank staff.132 They are all appointed for a period of  three years, 
subject to reappointment.133 There is no hearing before the Evaluation and Suspension 
Officer. Another point is that the hearings before the World Bank’s Sanctions Board 
‘shall remain confidential and not open or available to the public’.134 There are risks 
in seeing the immunities of  the Bank waived by domestic courts because the proce-
dure would not be considered compatible with jurisdictional requirements.135 Law 
firms have indicated their interest in attempting to challenge the Bank’s action in the 
courts.136
These developments are known to the World Bank. The outcome of  the audit of  the 
procedure conducted in 2011–2012 may lead to further judicialization of  the proce-
dure, perhaps with respect to the composition of  the Sanctions Board. For instance, a 
recommendation could be made that it should be composed only of  members external 
to the Bank.
There is no doubt that this factor, as well as other means of  pressure, contributes 
to a stronger trend towards more accountability regarding international organiza-
tions.137 In cases where there is no control mechanism provided for by the organiza-
tion concerned, a ‘decentralized review’ can prevent gaps in accountability.138 Judicial 
review contributes to the protection of  human rights. However, it cannot by itself  
ensure a sufficient level of  protection of  the rights and interests of  individuals when 
they are negatively affected by the decisions of  international organizations.139 An ade-
quate level of  protection can be achieved only through the establishment of  adequate 
remedy mechanisms by the institutions concerned.
131 Art. V, sect. 2 of  the Sanction Board’s Statute, supra note 80.
132 Ibid., Art. V, sect. 4.
133 Ibid., Art. V, sect. 5.
134 Art. VI, Sect. 6.03 (a) of  the World Bank Sanction Procedures, supra note 53.
135 On these risks see Wouters, Ryngaert, and Schmitt, ‘Western European Union v.  Siedler; General 
Secretariat of  the ACP Group v. Lutchmaya; General Secretariat of  the ACP Group v. B. D.’, 105 AJIL 
(2011) 560.
136 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer have, e.g., released a note in July 2010 stating that they are currently 
‘developing legal theories to challenge [the Bank’s] actions in domestic courts’: Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer US LLP, ‘Sanctions investigations by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks’, 
July 2010, at 3, available at: www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/July10/28402.pdf  (last visited 
1 Aug. 2012).
137 De Wet, ‘Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary Role of  Non-Judicial 
Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review’, in A.  von Bogdandy et  al. (eds), The Exercise of  Public 
Authority by International Institutions (2010), at 855–882.
138 Reinisch, ‘Conclusion’, in A. Reinisch (ed.), Challenging Acts of  International Organizations before National 
Courts (2010), at 273.
139 De Wet, supra note 137, at 881.
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Another issue is that the potential lifting of  immunities is linked to the human rights 
features of  the sanctions procedure that can lead to a debarment decision. Issues of  
human rights not directly linked to the procedure would not be able to be the object of  
a potential lifting of  immunities. As an example, allegations of  discriminatory prac-
tices between an entity that has been sanctioned and another entity engaged in fraud 
and corruption – but which had not been investigated – would not be amenable to the 
lifting of  immunities.140 One can see there a limit to the application of  the concept of  
access to justice as only some issues can be contested while others cannot be contested.
4 Concluding Remarks
The ability to sanction individuals and firms did not form part of  the initial powers of  
the World Bank. However, following a practical need to debar those who commit fraud 
and corruption, the Bank, on an ex nihilo basis, created a mechanism to this end which 
was progressively transformed and shaped into a mechanism with judicial features.
The sanctions process contains endogenous aspects that are linked to the pecu-
liarities of  the organization within which it was established. The World Bank’s struc-
ture, together with the type of  activities it conducts, has influenced the shaping of  
the mechanism. However, the mechanism has progressively emancipated itself  from 
the World Bank. International law requirements and pressures from outside have 
prompted this procedure to evolve. Access to justice within international organiza-
tions is under increasing pressure to meet the requirements of  a right to a fair trial. 
This has come into sharp focus following the decision of  the organization to sanction 
individuals, or more generally non-state actors. Judicial guarantees have had to be 
put in place.
Other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have developed a sanctions pro-
cess.141 Although the World Bank has at present the most developed process, it is inter-
esting to note that the other MDBs are following the Bank in a similar direction. Since 
2011, the Inter-American Development Bank’s Sanctions Process has for example 
had a two-tier procedure composed of  a Case Officer and of  a Sanctions Committee.142 
It must, however, be noted that substantive differences between the various sanctions 
processes of  the MDBs remain. As an example, in the context of  the Asian Development 
Bank there is no two-tier mechanism. Complaints or allegations are investigated by an 
Office of  Anti-corruption and Integrity (OAI) and then transmitted to a sanctioning 
organ, the Integrity Oversight Committee (IOC).143 Neither personal appearance nor 
legal representation is accorded to the respondent before the sanctioning organ.144
140 Williams, supra note 26, at 302.
141 For a comparative point of  view see Seiler and Madir, ‘Fight Against Corruption: Sanctions Regimes of  
Multilateral Development Banks’, 15 J Int’l Economic L (2012) 5.
142 See the Sanction Procedures of  the Inter-American Development Bank at: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36233155 (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
143 See http://beta.adb.org/site/integrity/faqs (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
144 Ibid.
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In April 2010, an agreement for mutual enforcement of  debarment decisions 
was signed between the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American 
Development Bank Group, and the World Bank.145 According to this agreement, 
each Bank will enforce debarment decisions made by another of  the parties, except 
in circumstances ‘where each enforcement would be inconsistent with the institu-
tion’s legal or other institutional considerations’.146 This agreement demonstrates the 
fact that, although each organization carries out its own investigation, in some cases 
a given organization may need to share information with another one.147 To avoid 
duplication of  their work through parallel investigations these institutions may coor-
dinate or, alternatively, one may take the lead in an investigation.148 This agreement 
seeks harmonization149 among the various sanctions processes. Deeper and broader 
harmon ization is expected in the future although for the present there are some 
important differences.
One of  the important aspects of  this agreement is related to the due process require-
ments to be followed by each institution. The parties agreed on the necessity to include 
as one of  the common core principles that the sanctioning institution has sanctions 
processes with certain key due process elements, such as the existence of  an internal 
investigative authority and a distinct decision-making authority,150 written and pub-
licly available procedures that require notice to be provided to accused parties as well 
as an opportunity to respond,151 a ‘more likely than not’ standard of  proof  or equiva-
lent,152 and a range of  sanctions that take into account the principle of  proportional-
ity, including aggravating and mitigating factors.153
In future the agreement will probably lead to increased harmonization among the 
different sanctions mechanisms, although each mechanism may retain certain speci-
ficities. The World Bank experience has demonstrated the need for due process and 
access to appropriate remedies when sanctioning individuals and companies. The 
other international organizations cannot escape from this logic either. In the fight 
against fraud and corruption, international organizations have to abide by principles 
of  justice, equity, and fair treatment. These principles are crucial in strengthening the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of  the activities of  these organizations.
145 See the full text of  the agreement at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/AgreementFor 
MutualEnforcementofDebarmentDecisions.pdf  (last visited 1 Aug. 2012).
146 Ibid., at para. 7.
147 Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of  a Droit 
Commun in the Field of  Development Finance’, in Cissé, Bradlow, and Kingsbury (eds), supra note 40, at 
185.
148 Ibid.
149 Zimmermann and Fariello, ‘Coordinating the Fight against Fraud and Corruption – Agreement on Cross-
Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks’, in ibid., at 185.
150 Art. 2, (c) i. of  the agreement, supra note 145.
151 Ibid., Art. 2, (c) ii.
152 Ibid., Art. 2, (c) iii.
153 Ibid., Art. 2, (c) iv.
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